Introduction

Realism, one of the dominant theories in international relations, is grounded in the assumption that states operate in an anarchic world of self-interested actors engaging in power politics.[1] These "rational actors" are fundamental to realist theory, where rationality is defined as states acting strategically to ensure national security and state sovereignty while maximizing their power.[2] Moreover, this understanding of rationality is characterized by power calculations and strategic thinking, and equated with traditional masculine characteristics, Using such rationality, military power and the use of force are often prioritized over diplomatic solutions, which are perceived as feminine, or weak. Thus, for realists, the rational actor minimizes the complexities of state decision-making to mere power politics and rejects the effectiveness of non-violent approaches and cooperation. This essay will examine how the realist articulation of “rational actors” is rooted in masculinity, exploring how gendered preconceptions shape the understanding of rationality in power politics. It will also analyze the Obama administration’s redline foreign policy to exemplify how perceptions of rationality as masculine influence world politics.  

 

Literature Review

According to John Mearsheimer’s The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, there are five core realist assumptions that characterize international politics: 1) the international system is anarchic, 2) great powers possess military capability, 3) uncertainty regarding other states’ potential actions, 4) states prioritize survival, and 5) states are rational actors.[3] This essay will focus on Mearsheimer’s fifth assumption where he states that "great powers are rational actors.” In particular, Mearsheimer, highlights that states are “aware of their external environment and think strategically about how to survive in it.[4] This implies one “right” or “rational” action that is framed as strategic, often battle-oriented, connected to Clausewitz’s conceptualization of strategy.[5] Clausewitz, one of the first theorists who attempted to comprehensively analyze this concept, defined strategy as the “theory of the use of combat for the object of the War.”[6] This seemingly inherent connection between strategy and military action became a “congenital bellicosity” that instrumentalized war, converting it into one powerful way to achieve political outcomes.[7] This paper challenges primacy of war and military engagement as the sole strategic and rational ways to navigate the complexity of international politics. In order to deconstruct this idea, we first need to understand rationality and its origins. 

 

Is Rationality Real?

Research in behavioral economics and psychology challenges the assumption that individuals, and by extension, states, actually can behave rationally. Scholars such as Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky argue that decision-making is often influenced by cognitive biases, emotions, and social pressures.[8] This assertion directly contradicts the theory that there are purely rational actors in international relations. More often than not, government officials make decisions based on cognitive biases such as overconfidence, loss aversion, groupthink, and the results of echo chambers, rather than through objective calculations of power and survival. This paper uses a psychological and philosophical analysis of the concept of rationality to examine the possibility that gender biases are embedded in the conceptualization of the “rational actor”. 

 

Psychological research supports a thinking/feeling gender bias where the concept of rationality is semantically associated with male and emotionality is linked to female.[9] The psychological study “Rationality is Gendered” provides empirical proof that supports an association of not simply prescriptive stereotypes, that is, the conversion of a descriptive gender stereotype from “mere description to moral injunction,” but also conceptual associations of gender and rationality.[10] This gendering of rationality goes beyond individual stereotyping regarding how different genders should act, and penetrates institutions, perpetuating structural inequalities. Conceptual associations of rationality to masculinity completely exclude women, as “it is not a quest simply of the applicability to women of neutrally specified ideals of rationality rather of the genderization of the ideals themselves; knowledge, reason, and rationality as well as the knowing subject.”[11] This becomes dangerous as it creates “rational elite” solely rooted in manhood, completely excluding from the term any notions associated with the feminine.[12] With many disciplines’ theories of rationality being gendered, a complete rethinking and systemic reconstruction of the concept across fields such as political science, economics, and philosophy is necessary in order to identify the effects of masculine assumptions. 

 

The Birth of Rationality Through The Philosophical Lens 

Historically, philosophy has focused heavily on conceptualizing rationality, which is often praised as the highest standard of intellect, given that it includes the pursuit of an objective truth that is acquired by using logic.[13] Rationality is hence supposedly free from cognitive biases, historical, and social contexts. However, psychology shows that such a pursuit is aspirational, not possible, begging the question of how presumptions of rationality are constructed. And, indeed, the creation of the abstract concept of rationality appears to be derived from traditionally masculine traits. According to Lloyd, the relationship between rationality and masculinity is "no superficial linguistic bias" but rather "lies deep in our philosophic tradition.”[14] In particular, she mentions that “rationality has been conceived of as “transcendence of the feminine itself: and the ‘feminine’ itself has been partly constituted by its occurrence within this structure.”[15] The feminine therefore becomes not simply less rational, but is positioned outside of this hierarchy, creating a binary structural framework. This connection between masculinity and rationality can be traced back to ancient Greece, where Greek philosophers assumed a connection between femininity and nature, and masculinity and reason.[16] The acquisition of reason in philosophy is often translated as rationality, thus distancing the feminine from the rational by creating a dichotomy that perpetuates a hierarchy where masculinity is elevated. 

 

Throughout time, this distance has been amplified by men who dominated the philosophical space, particularly Francis Bacon, the father of empiricism. Empiricism is a field of epistemology related to rationality, and Bacon studied objective observation, inductive reasoning, experimentation, and the control of nature, creating a basis for the birth of scientific methodology and research.[17] While Bacon’s contributions were crucial in revolutionizing knowledge production and science, they also reinforced an exclusive framework of rationality – limited by both race and gender. In particular, Bacon’s philosophy around knowledge acquisition included not just the observation of nature, but also its domination and control.[18] This approach promoted a gendered framework where nature (something historically associated with the feminine) was portrayed as something passive to be controlled by the rational (implicitly masculine) mind. Bacon’s approach to knowledge acquisition also justified colonial quests at the time that were perceived as mere exploration rather than exploitation. Hence, this conceptualization of science associated with objective and rational behavior reflects Western, masculine standards of domination, conquest, and power. [19]

 

Max Weber’s notion of instrumental rationality is a specifically political philosophy approach to rationality and also reflects a masculine bias. Weber’s theory emphasizes efficiency and control over emotions and subjective considerations. This has been built into our understanding of institutions, essentially gendering organizational structures, including political and governmental structures, and shaping their behavior, actions, and expectations.[20] As Bologh says:

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Value-rational action tends to degenerate into instrumentally rational action which corresponds with the cult of masculinity, a male chauvinism that values physical strength and bravado as an end in itself. This traditional version of masculinity becomes supplemented in the modern capitalist world with the instrumental use of monetary calculations for determining the most effective, most efficient means for realizing one's material self interest. Instrumental, purposeful, calculating rationality, determining the least costly, most beneficial means for achieving ends, implies reliance on precise measurements, comparison and quantitative calculation of costs and benefits with a jettisoning of all non-quantifiable considerations . . . Instrumental, calculating rationality brings with it qualities considered masculine: smart and decisive self determination or free, confident aggressive action.[21] 

 

Hence, Western-rooted “masculine rationality” is ultimately linked to three core characteristics: 1) control 2) decisiveness, and 3) aggression.

 

Control is related to Bacon’s idea of not simply understanding nature but having the need to control or dominate it to be perceived as powerful. In the context of international politics, Bacon’s philosophy can be used to explain how states pursue control through the monopolistic hold on power. This view of control and dominance as a means to stability creates a global order that is hierarchically structured and prioritizes competition and unilateral action. As a result, political realists perceive cooperation, multilateral diplomacy, intergovernmental organizations, and shared governance as irrational and compromising, reducing a state’s relative power and autonomy. 

 

Decisiveness is another masculine characteristic linked to strength, confidence, and readiness. In the political sphere, people who are perceived as decisive are considered competent leaders because they can navigate through uncertainty. Hesitation and emotional or moral influences, which are often related to femininity, exist outside of the spectrum of decisiveness and hence, rationality. In a rigid framework where reflection, deliberation, or emotional complexity become feminized and devalued, male figures in positions of power distance themselves from empathy or introspection. Such an approach influences the decision-making of the states and their leaders’ responses to international issues, since it pressures them to project a façade of being ever-ready for action and to project their strength without hesitation. Thoughtful behavior and negotiation – which include a lengthy process and the potential change of a decision – signify weakness and irrationality. This conversion of masculine traits, arguably toxically masculine traits, to state behavior becomes harmful as it discourages consideration of compromise that could be absolutely beneficial, but not relative gains. 

 

Aggression, the third of masculine characteristics that plays an important role in supposedly rational states’ behavior. In the sphere of international relations, there is a tendency to prioritize wins over losses and to praise action over non-action. Action relying on military force is considered the ultimate expression of strength and domination, another example of the prioritization of masculinized behavior as the primary way to assert sovereignty and command respect. This inspires a vicious cycle of aggression, because it is viewed as the only desirable response, consequently creating a binary where aggressive “action” is rational and diplomatic “inaction” is irrational. Actions short of military engagement are framed as a lack of response and characterized as weak, showcasing vulnerability instead of assertiveness. Realist theorists suggest that states, as rational actors, must prioritize their own security and dominance in an anarchic international system in defense of their sovereignty and independence. 

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Gendered Rationality in Obama’s Redlining 

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​​In August 2012, President Obama used coercive diplomacy by publicly stating that the Assad regime's further deployment of chemical weapons in Syria would cross a "redline" and lead to the US’s military involvement. Nonetheless, in 2013, Assad’s regime again used chemical weapons, leaving Obama to decide whether to act according to his redline. This was a particularly hard decision since Obama’s previous statement set expectations regarding Obama’s reaction, creating a dilemma between maintaining credibility and avoiding escalation as well as between deciding based on domestic public opinion or U.S. long term stability.

 

According to the documentary Obama at War, following Assad’s use of chemical weapons, Obama ordered the Pentagon to prepare for attack.[22] However, President Obama started to doubt the rationality of this decision, reconsidering whether he should engage the United States in a long-term military intervention. Obama chose to take this decision to the Congress, which he knew would oppose the military deployment. Secretary of State John Kerry proposed that Obama offer a diplomatic solution where Assad could avoid the U.S. planned airstrikes if he gave up his chemical weapons.[23] Obama agreed and began working with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov who contacted his Syrian counterpart. This collaboration eventually led Assad to surrender his chemical weapons.[24]

 

Obama’s decision was a diplomatic success, as he used the set expectations to his advantage, redefining the rules of the negotiation. This led to a previously unimaginable outcome; the destruction of Assad’s chemical weapons, something that never would have been achieved if Obama had followed up on his threat.  The public announcement of Obama’s threat was not, as many argued, useless or humiliating. If Obama had not set these expectations before the use of chemical weapons by Assad’s regime, he would have not been able to renegotiate the terms and use the deterrent capacity of the United States to destroy Syria’s weapons. His decision showcases his understanding of the destructive consequences and his intelligence to take advantage of the new information and maximize the outcome based on the circumstances. 

 

However, people in the political spaces as well as the general American public perceived Obama's decision as a failure. Public opinion polls reflected the belief that Obama was a weak representative of the United States, who did not use military force to enact his policy. According to realist critics, Obama’s decision not to send missiles signaled the United States’ inconsistency to the international community and jeopardized the country’s reputation as a hegemonic power, as it seemed to not follow through on its threats.[25]

 

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In keeping with the foregoing discussion of the masculinist assumption baked into the conventional understanding of rationality, it should be clear that Obama’s decision to negotiate was perceived as irrational and weak precisely because it did not conform to the traditional realist and masculine standards of power politics and the use of force. I will specifically analyze Obama’s decision under the three characteristics of Western masculine rationality analyzed above: decisiveness, control, and aggression.

 

One of the most common criticisms of Obama’s decisions was related to his – and thus the United States’ - credibility. This disapproval is connected to the characteristic of decisiveness. Particularly, the characteristic of decisiveness is linked with the gendered perspective of “keeping one’s word.” The idea of promise-keeping is related to manhood and is expressed by everyday sayings, such as “a man of his word,” implying a connection between integrity, credibility, and gender. Obama’s set expectation of a forceful response and his later reconsideration of that threat, could be interpreted as indecisiveness 

 

In addition to credibility, the absence of direct action – characteristics of the concept of control– also led some people to perceive Obama’s solution as weak. By working alongside Russia to achieve the policy goal, the U.S. defied the traditional model that translates unilateral action as sign of strength, where a powerful state is capable of imposing its decisions in order to control other states. Obama’s approach to collaboration rendered his response a relinquishing of control, since the outcome depended on multiple actors and their input. This perception persisted even though Obama ultimately retained control over the situation, redefining the rules and maximizing the U.S.’s benefit while avoiding conflict. Control need not always be synonymous with unilateral and direct action, but realist critics could not interpret it any other way.

 

Finally, the absence of the use of force and visible action –related to the characteristic of aggression– is another reason why Obama’s decision was not approved by the public opinion. Obama did not demonstrate US hard power to the international community but rather negotiated behind the scenes, relying on the US’s diplomatic power. If the realists’ gendered presumptions of rationality are relaxed, Obama’s successful use of diplomacy and negotiation is a testament that power can be expressed through patience, collaboration, confidence, and stability. In a way, the absence of a visible response required the most courage and strength, since the social expectations and public opinion pressured him to take a certain stance and retaliate with the use of force. Critiques of Obama’s decision to change his strategy are captured in news articles, cartoons, and popular culture at large that were published during this time. The examples below highlight some of these criticisms, most specifically unfulfilled threats, weakness, and unresponsiveness, all linked to the three core characteristics of gendered rationality mentioned above. 

 

While one could argue that Obama’s ability to ignore public judgment and prioritize the state’s security, long-term stability, and cost-efficiency by negotiating behind the scenes rather than following through on his redline was in reality a strong and courageous act, that certainly was not the general perception, in large part because his behavior was not consistent with the masculinized rationality most Americans expect. 

 

Though it is difficult to predict what would have happened if Obama had made the decision to send missiles against Assad’s regime, it is not hard to imagine that the human security costs would have been high. Obama arguably made a wise – a rational - decision in the US interest by choosing a policy option that did not involve the use of military force. Rather than conforming to the masculinized perception of rationality, it was a success because it avoided violence and led to the elimination of unregistered chemical weapons in Syria.  

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Conclusion

In conclusion, even though states’ leaders primarily succumb to realist doctrine when making decisions, it is important to question and redefine certain concepts, such as rationality, within these paradigms to expand the scope of policy options for policymakers. Identifying the conflation of rationality with innately masculine concepts allows for a broader perspective on state behavior that embraces, rather than rejecting, negotiation, collaboration, and mutual understanding.

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Endnotes

1.  Korab-Karpowicz, W. Julian. “Political Realism in International Relations.” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Stanford University, (2023) plato.stanford.edu/entries/realism-intl-relations/. 

2.  Mearsheimer, John J.  “The Tragedy of Great Power Politics.” New York: W.W. Norton & Company, (2001).

3.  Mearsheimer, John J.  “The Tragedy of Great Power Politics.” New York: W.W. Norton & Company, (2001).

4.  Ibid.

5.  von Clausewitz, Carl. “On War”. Translated by J. J. Graham, Wordsworth Editions, (1997).

6.  Garard, Olivia A. “An Annotated Guide to Tactics Carl von Clausewitz’s Theory of the Combat”, Marine Corps University Press, (2021). www.usmcu.edu/Portals/218/GuidetoTactics-web.pdf. 

7.  Miyata, Francis. “The Grand Strategy of Carl von Clausewitz.” War Room - U.S. Army War College (2021), warroom.armywarcollege.edu/articles/grand-strategy-clausewitz/. 

8.  Kahneman, Daniel & Tversky, Amos, “Prospect theory An analysis of decision making under risk.” Econometrica, (1979). 

9.  Pavco-Giaccia, Olivia, et al. “Rationality Is Gendered”, University of California Press, 2019. online.ucpress.edu/collabra/article/5/1/54/113043/Rationality-is-Gendered. 

10.  Renström, Emma A. “Differences between Prescriptive and Proscriptive Gender Stereotypes and Gendered Self‐evaluations in Sweden”, Scandinavian Journal of Psychology, (2023) onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/sjop.12995. 

11.  Lloyd, Genevieve. “The man of reason: "male" and "female" in Western philosophy.” Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. (1993)

12.  Ibid.

13.  “Rationality.” The Decision Lab, thedecisionlab.com/reference-guide/philosophy/rationality, (2024).

14. 16.  Lloyd, Genevieve. “The man of reason: "male" and "female" in Western philosophy.” Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. (1993)

15.  Ibid.

16.  Lloyd, Genevieve. “The man of reason: "male" and "female" in Western philosophy.” Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. (1993)

17.  Klein, Jürgen. “Francis Bacon.” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Stanford University,  (2012), plato.stanford.edu/entries/francis-bacon/.

18.  Lloyd, Genevieve. “The man of reason: "male" and "female" in Western philosophy.” Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. (1993)

19.  Ross-Smith, Anne. and Kornberger, Martin. “Gendered Rationality? A Genealogical Exploration of the Philosophical and Sociological Conceptions of Rationality, Masculinity and Organization.” Gender, Work & Organization, (2004). https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0432.2004.00232.x

20.  Ross-Smith, Anne. and Kornberger, Martin. “Gendered Rationality? A Genealogical Exploration of the Philosophical and Sociological Conceptions of Rationality, Masculinity and Organization.” Gender, Work & Organization, (2004). https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0432.2004.00232.x

21.  Bologh, Roslyn. Love or Greatness: Max Weber and Masculine Thinking. Taylor & Francis, 2009. 

22.  Smith, Martin, “Obama at War”, Frontline, Public Broadcasting Service, (2015).

23.  Taddonio, Patrice. “‘The President Blinked’: Why Obama Changed Course on the ‘Red Line’ in Syria.” Frontline, Public Broadcasting Service, (2015) .www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/the-president-blinked-why-obama-changed-course-on-the-red-line-in-syria/. 

24.  Ibid.

25.  “Reassessing Obama’s Biggest Mistake.” The Economist, The Economist Newspaper, 2023, www.economist.com/international/2023/08/22/reassessing-barack-obamas-red-line-in-syria.

 

Bibliography

Bologh, Roslyn. Love or Greatness: Max Weber and Masculine Thinking. Taylor & Francis, 2009.

Klein, Jürgen. “Francis Bacon.” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Stanford University,  (2012), plato.stanford.edu/entries/francis-bacon/. 

 

Horsey, David. “Obama’s Red Line on Syria Gets Squiggly.” Baltimore Sun, Baltimore (2019), www.baltimoresun.com/2013/05/07/obamas-red-line-on-syria-gets-squiggly/. 

 

Kahneman, Daniel & Tversky, Amos, “Prospect theory: An analysis of decision making under risk.” Econometrica, (1979). 

 

Korab-Karpowicz, W. Julian. “Political Realism in International Relations.” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Stanford University, (2023) plato.stanford.edu/entries/realism-intl-relations/. 

 

Lloyd, Genevieve. “The man of reason: "male" and "female" in Western philosophy.” Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. (1993)

 

Mearsheimer, John J.  “The Tragedy of Great Power Politics.” New York: W.W. Norton & Company, (2001).

 

Miyata, Francis. “The Grand Strategy of Carl von Clausewitz.” War Room - U.S. Army War College (2021), warroom.armywarcollege.edu/articles/grand-strategy-clausewitz/. 

 

Obama red-lines himself into a corner on Syria”, iPolitics, (2013),

www.ipolitics.ca/news/obama-red-lines-himself-into-a-corner-on-syria. 

 

Pavco-Giaccia, Olivia, et al. “Rationality Is Gendered”, University of California Press, 2019. online.ucpress.edu/collabra/article/5/1/54/113043/Rationality-is-Gendered. 

 

Rationality.” The Decision Lab, thedecisionlab.com/reference-guide/philosophy/rationality, (2024). 

 

“Reassessing Obama’s Biggest Mistake.” The Economist, The Economist Newspaper, 2023, www.economist.com/international/2023/08/22/reassessing-barack-obamas-red-line-in-syria.

 

Renström, Emma A. “Differences between Prescriptive and Proscriptive Gender Stereotypes and Gendered Self‐evaluations in Sweden”, Scandinavian Journal of Psychology, (2023) onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/sjop.12995. 

 

Ross-Smith, Anne. and Kornberger, Martin. “Gendered Rationality? A Genealogical Exploration of the Philosophical and Sociological Conceptions of Rationality, Masculinity and Organization.” Gender, Work & Organization, (2004). https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0432.2004.00232.x

 

“Staying out of Syria Is the Bolder Call for Obama.”, Financial Times, (2013), www.ft.com/content/371d8de6-bbba-11e2-a4b4-00144feab7de. 

 

Smith, Martin, “Obama at War”, Frontline, Public Broadcasting Service, (2015).

 

Taddonio, Patrice. “‘The President Blinked’: Why Obama Changed Course on the ‘Red Line’ in Syria.” Frontline, Public Broadcasting Service, (2015) .www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/the-president-blinked-why-obama-changed-course-on-the-red-line-in-syria/. 

 

von Clausewitz, Carl. “On War”. Translated by J. J. Graham, Wordsworth Editions, (1997).

Garard, Olivia A. “An Annotated Guide to Tactics Carl von Clausewitz’s Theory of the Combat”, Marine Corps University Press, (2021). www.usmcu.edu/Portals/218/GuidetoTactics-web.pdf.