A Blight on the Conscience of Humanity: The Threat of Terror and Extremism for the Women of al-Hol
by Diana Zhou
Introduction
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Figure 1: The al-Hol camp in Syria.
“The dead turned up everywhere. Two decapitated corpses in a cesspit. The remains of a woman with a pierced skull. A child with a bullet hole in his temple. Men clustering around a ditch suggested the worst, as did women running full speed through the dirt.”1
In the southern outskirts of northern Syria, close to the Syria-Iraq border, the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Force (SDF) operates the al-Hol detention camp. In total, the camp houses around 65,000 Syrian and foreign Islamic State (ISIS) suspects and affiliated family members, primarily women and children.2 The camp was initially a refugee camp established for Iraqis fleeing the Gulf War. Then, in 2019, when the SDF, backed by American forces, toppled the remnants of ISIS’s “caliphate” in Syria, many of those who had lived under the caliphate or had been connected to ISIS were brought into the camp. At the initial screening, the camp officials imprisoned the able-bodied men away from their families, while allowing only women and children into the camp.3 Later, men and women mixed in the different areas of the camp. As of March 2024, 20% of the detainees at al-Hol are men.4 Many detainees had joined ISIS or been married to someone who joined. However, many others had no links to ISIS or were fleeing to the camp to escape US-led bombings. More than half of the population at al-Hol are children, the majority of whom are younger than twelve, with dozens of new babies born each month.5 (*
The Kurdish army established these camps to hold individuals displaced from ISIS, ISIS suspects awaiting trial, and foreign ISIS suspects and affiliates waiting to be repatriated back home.6 However, while the Kurdish administration and bureaucracy struggle to negotiate the terms of the prisoners’ detention, trial, and release, the situation is further complicated bythe SDF’s lack of authority and power in the region. Although the SDF defeated the Islamic State’s caliphate in and around Raqqa and established the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria in 2018, it still struggles with the non-Kurdish elements in the region, opposition from Arab tribe members, and the ongoing threat of missile attacks from the Turkish military against SDF military and civilian infrastructure, including the al-Hol camp.7 On November 23, 2022, Turkish forces struck an SDF post at al-Hol camp, killing eight guards and causing a temporary suspension of aid and assistance for the detainees, sending a shockwave of fear and horror into the camp.8 Moreover, while the Kurdish army maintains security measures, the U.S. State Department pays the U.S. group Blumont to manage the camp, with some humanitarian assistance also funded by allies such as France and Norway.9
As a result of the external threats and internal negligence, the United Nations has described the conditions in the camp to be “a blight on the conscious of humanity.”10 The Rights and Security Organization outlined the human rights and international law violations of the al-Hol camp in their report:
“Hunger, thirst, poor sanitation, and inadequate shelter are pervasive problems in the camp, jeopardizing the lives of both children and adults. Plastic tents collapse, flood, become contaminated with sewage, and catch fire: reports indicate that 13 children in al Hol camp died between January and September 2021 as a result of fire-related injury. Malnutrition, dehydration, and diarrhea have been linked to illnesses and deaths in the camp…. Since our last report was published, children have spent another year of their short lives facing serious threats to their development due to the inadequate nutrition, lack of healthcare, an unsafe environment, and limited educational opportunities.”11
This paper follows how a camp, created to provide a safe, temporary accommodation and humanitarian services to those displaced by the war in Syria and Iraq turned into an “open-air prison,” breeding not only terror and abuse for the already traumatized women, but indoctrination of extremism amongst of detainees.12
The Willing, the Unwilling
When the detainees trickled into the camp, the authorities made no distinction on how one came to be “affiliated” with ISIS. There were women who chose to join ISIS, the most extreme of the true believers.13 More often than not, they were women who “fell in love with the wrong man, sought refuge in the wrong town.”14
There has been extensive research done on female radicalization in the Islamic State for the “willing” ISIS affiliates — the fighters and supporters. Women’s recruitment into ISIS is just as radical as the men.15 ISIS primarily targets young women, promising them a wonderful life as a “jihadist bride,” promising personal power with a united society and the power of a common cause:
“A wonderful life and [that] all of their needs will be taken care of. They are promised a wonderful husband and a free house with top-of-the-line appliances, such as a fridge, microwave, and milkshake machine. Most importantly, they are told that their husband will care for them and that if he dies, she will instantly be transformed into a hero—the wife of a martyr.”16
But women are equally motivated by political agendas. ISIS recruitment propaganda portrays “women taking up arms and acting outside of these strictly delineated gender roles were used to shame and deplore the lack of men willing to come to their defense, making it necessary for women to act as men.”17 The presentation of the “women in Jihad” provides women with a paradox of freedom and an independent, rational choice to reject both the feminism associated with the West and the conventional local gender norms that repress women. ISIS promised female recruits the fulfillment of religious honor, state building, sisterhood, and romance.18 A vast majority of ISIS recruits also come from a place of hopelessness and ignorance. Many were bent on revenge after experiencing the devastating loss of their loved ones or wished to command fear and respect after suffering from a profoundly unequal society. Most of them were not inclined to religious extremism until they joined.
Figure 2: The all-women al-Khansaa Brigade, responsible for recruitment and disseminating ISIS propaganda.
On the other hand, some found themselves guilty by association — they were the “unwilling.” Many women found themselves married to ISIS fighters when their previously non-extremist husbands joined ISIS. Jihan, who now resides in the al-Hol camp with her children, recounts how both sides of the family condemned her husband’s decision to join ISIS. She stood by her husband in a testament of faith and love when she knew no one else would. But her husband soon died fighting for ISIS and she felt too ashamed to return to her family. She wanted nothing to do with ISIS. She said that she “hated [her husband]—for his stubbornness, his zealotry, his bloodlust, his willingness to destroy her life,” yet, after his death, her association with him landed her a position at al-Hol.19 In other cases, women found themselves in a situation where safety or religious necessities forced them to live with ISIS members. Some detainees, men and women, accounted that “ISIS fighters commandeered the ground floor of the apartment building where [they] lived with his parents and siblings. Residents begged the militants to leave, but they refused. The residents had nowhere to go and remained in their homes.”20 In their case, regardless of their gender, they had no agency under ISIS. Other times, the specific rules imposed on women by the Islamic caliphate forced women to live with their male ISIS family members. The Islamic State’s al-Bathuth wa al-Eftaa’ Committee issued a fatwa, an Islamic religious edict, that “ensures that women’s movements are heavily restricted without being in the presence of a mahram,” a male family member.21 Thus, the strict doctrines left women with no agency. To conduct the daily activities needed to survive, such as getting groceries or water, women must live with male family members, despite who they are. For example, this religious necessity was the reason why Asma had to move in with her brothers, two ISIS members, after her husband died and she had no male relatives around.22
During the Deir el-Zour raid, where the SDF retook the last ISIS stronghold in eastern Syria, Jihan and her family, who were taking refuge in Deir el-Zour, were captured by SDF after this raid and sent to al-Hol.
https://youtu.be/KSW0mnGvE9U?si=RILiKs58XaG_bgl2
In more extreme cases, women were forcibly married to ISIS fighters. The decades of war and drought have left Syrians in a lonely and impoverished place. Out of sheer hope that a marriage would at least grant their daughter some food, many married their daughters to ISIS fighters because they could not afford to provide for them anymore.23 Other times, such as in the Shuhail tribe, a massacre committed by ISIS left people fearing for their lives and beginning to marry their daughters to ISIS fighters for their safety.24 ISIS also has an interest in seeing the highest number of women married to their fighters because it ensures them the next generation of willing martyrs. In the caliphate, ISIS sheiks have issued many religious decrees that promote marriage to their soldiers, with money and power being the primary incentive, especially because many young Syrian men have left the country or been killed. Also, ISIS has outlawed any social or women’s organizations that could protect women from these insecurities and forced marriages.25 In addition, with Syria still being a tribal society, marriage is also seen as a political tactic. Tribal leaders will facilitate the union of (willing and unwilling) brides to ISIS fighters to strengthen their social position and placate ISIS animosity.26 ISIS men then take full advantage of the known economic and social challenges that single women face and offer high dowries in exchange.27 In all these cases, women lose the agency to choose and must succumb to strenuous societal pressures to keep themselves and their families safe.
The predicaments facing the two groups of women, the willing and unwilling, are complex . However, when they are integrated into a setting like the al-Hol camp, it creates an even more complex situation. The unwilling affiliates, who were guilty by association, are victims of ISIS ideology and terror. However, other victims of ISIS see them as their enemies, and many ISIS affiliates have voiced their fear of retaliation on them or their families in the camp.28 The dilemma of the unwilling affiliates contrasts with the willing affiliates, who still very much hold onto their ISIS ideologies and strive to recreate the caliphate. Thus, the camp’s integration of the willing and unwilling ISIS affiliates facilitated the trauma of these women by subjecting them to the terror and abuse of pro-ISIS women. This problem escalated so much that international organizations now see the radicalization and terrorization of the unwilling associates by the willing associates as a security threat, both to their victims and also to the greater international community.
Trauma and Radicalization
Within the camp, the Kurdish guards are responsible for patrolling the camp’s perimeters, managing the camp’s civilian administration, coordinating with the aid workers, and organizing the distribution of basic aid and services. However, the camp itself is effectively under the control of a group of ISIS inmates called the Hesba. Observers noted how the “all-female squads of religious police pressure women to cover head to toe in the black niqab; they have dragged to makeshift Sharia courts, where judges order floggings and executions. Assassination cells gun down inmates accused of passing information to camp authorities.”29 They also “administer harsh punishments, including murder, to local and international aid workers as well as to other women in the camp who attempt to sever their ties to the terrorist organization.”30 The Hesba has further traumatized the women, like Jihan, Asma, and Fatima, and all those who are guilty by association, by imposing the equivalent of the “caliphate” onto the camp. Other pro-ISIS women, mainly the foreign ISIS wives, the al-Muhajirat, terrorize the former ISIS wives or affiliates who feel remorse over their connection to ISIS. These conditions have propelled the women at the camp, who have already lost so much and have already escaped the Islamic State, back into another “caliphate.”
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Figure 3: Detainees wearing the niqab at al-Hol, the ultraconservative religious face covering mandated by ISIS, now by the Hesba.
“This place is a literal breeding ground for the next generation of ISIS.” – Gen. Michael Kurilla, commander of U.S. Central Command.
The Hesba and the al-Muhajirat testify to another problem facing the women at al-Hol: radicalization and extremism. This security threat does not apply only to the women in the camp but to the entire international community. The concentration of ISIS extremists in a relatively unmoderated environment like al-Hol has concerned international actors because of the possibility of ISIS resurgence from the recruitment and training administered by ISIS members within the camp. Authorities have already intercepted repeated attempts by the ISIS women to communicate with ISIS fighters using covert phones or informal Hawala-style transfer services to transfer information or money. Further, another concern is the camp’s young, orphaned, and impressionable children. An estimated 64% of the inhabitants at al-Hol are children, and 50% of the inhabitants are under the age of 12.31 International actors have already observed that if the women and children are not adequately cared for, leaving them in the camp only leads them to further indoctrination, instilling them with desire for revenge for families killed in battle with the SDF or the US.32 Reporters at the camp have observed that the devoted ISIS followers leaveimmediately for the Badia desert after their release to serve as ISIS fighters.33 In addition, the women are also forcing adolescent girls to marry to produce more ISIS fighters.34 One woman’s proclamation on an Al Arabiya TV channel perfectly sums up the nexus between the ISIS women, the children, and ISIS resurgence:
“Our faith, ideology have been implanted here forever, and America, the Kurds, the infidels, and the Jews will not be able to remove it. This is a belief that has been instilled in our children too, and we will never regret it. We will continue, because the caliphate will return again.”35
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fIPgZE2yuOU&ab_channel=AlHadath%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%AF%D8%AB
One young boy tells Al Hadath reporter how he learned to murder one of his friends at the camp by stabbing his friend ten times in the neck and body with a knife because the friend was “fighting against the religion of God.” The teenager also says that his mother received instructions and money from ISIS for the murder of two men connected to the Idlib.
One proposed solution has been repatriating women and their children to their home countries or towns. The Syrians from the northeast Kurdish-controlled regions can return to their hometowns if a tribal sponsor submits their names to the Kurdish authorities at the camp. After vetting the names, the detainees are allowed to return to their tribe.36 However, for the Syrians in the Turkish-controlled zones, regime-held areas, or Idlib areas under Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, the active war between the Kurds and these groups hinders the prospect of even regular conversations, making formal returns impossible.37 Many clans, authorities, and local communities have also banned the return of ISIS affiliates due to stigma of the affiliates and fear of their extremism.38 The situation is more favorable for Iraqis, whose government has actively begun recovering its nationals from al-Hol. However, the Iraqi Ministry of Interior still estimated that about 250,000 Iraqi ISIS associates across different refugee camps (including al-Hol) are unable to return home due to political and social constraints despite government efforts.39 The Iraqi National Security Service has issued attainable security permits upon an affiliate’s disavowal from ISIS. At the same time, local leaders have encouraged ISIS affiliates to file a criminal report against their affiliated ISIS members to obtain a security clearance back to Iraq. On March 10, 2024, the Iraqi government just repatriated 157 families (625 people) from al-Hol.40 They join the roughly 1,920 Iraqi families transferred so far.41 Upon their return, they undergo weeks or months of detention in Iraqi facilities to assess their security situation.42 However, even if Iraqis and Syrians can return to their hometowns, they still face the possible destruction of their homes and ostracism and retaliation from ISIS victims. Successful return requires rehabilitation, reintegration, and the restoration of social cohesion in war-torn communities across the Middle East.
The situation of the foreign women detained at al-Hol is more complicated. Some states, such as Albania, Germany, Russia, France, Uzbekistan, Kosovo, and some Central Asian countries repatriated some of their citizens detained at the camps, mainly women and children.43 Kyrgyzstan took back 95 wives and children in August 2023, adding to the 59 nationals from February and the 79 from March 2021.44 Australia brought back four women and 13 children in October 2022, while 50 Australians remain at al-Hol.45 However, many countries are still concerned about the ISIS affiliates posing a threat to domestic security and would only repatriate orphaned children.46 Britain, for example, only repatriated ten orphaned youths from al-Hol in December 2023, and the government put them up for adoption in the country upon their return.47
In the meantime, some EU countries have explored the possibility of establishing a tribunal to try the ISIS affiliates in Syria because Syria cannot try foreign nationals and, therefore, can only send them to al-Hol. However, the logistics of ensuring a fair trial and the likelihood of inadequate jail sentences prevented the EU nations from going forward. While international actors have called for immediate attention to the alarming extremism in the al-Hol camp, resolution remains stalled. For Jihan, Asma, Fatima, and countless other women and children, al-Hol continues to be their prison and home for the foreseeable future, a place where they must contemplate raising their kids, watching them get married, and eventually growing old.
Conclusion
The gross human rights violation in the al-Hol camp demonstrate that the international community, despite decades of counterterrorism operations, has not figured out how to productively address ISIS affiliates, including both true believers and women and children whose circumstances tied them to ISIS, however unwillingly. Many of the affected women and children have no agency in their circumstances, having suffered great injustice and oppression from their husbands, communities, and the caliphate. Even after their “liberation” from ISIS and the caliphate, they have no agency at the hands of yet another oppressive system that pays little to no attention to their needs and care. As a result, the very victims al-Hol aims to protect are further victimized . Conditions in the camp, including mixing true believers with victims, ultimately increases development of Islamic extremism and feeds more soldiers into the Islamic State. To begin correcting the mistake that has left 65,000 women and children in dire need, the international community must focus on a few key issues:
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Immediate food and security improvements at the camp: On January 27, humanitarian activities have been suspended (excluding bread distribution, water provision, waste management, and health services) following the attacks on several aid workers by pro-ISIS cells within the camp.48 Food distribution has been delayed or suspended in certain areas of the camp, and there is a supply shortage of fuel for cooking and other necessities because of the disruption.49 The international community must ensure that humanitarian services and necessities will continue to be distributed and available to all detainees, increasing security if required.
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Education programs for the children: Fewer than half of the 25,000 children at al-Hol receive education, and even then, very little.50 Orkesh Centre and al-Houri are two rehabilitation facilities two hours away from al-Hol that house boys and teach them tolerance and practical skills for future jobs, like a tailor or barber.51 However, they require that the children be removed from their parents, which could cause anxiety and further trauma for both the mother and children.52 Further, even after the children have received their education, they cannot leave due to issues with repatriation in their home country, both in the Middle East and the West.53 Thus, to increase the effectiveness of education in combating radicalization, it must be paired with effective repatriation and/or resettlement policies.
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Repatriation of ISIS affiliates and their children: The most important and most stable solution would be to repatriate the various ISIS affiliates and their children. Repatriation policies must consider the individual experiences of the ISIS affiliates to determine their status (their involvement in ISIS) and their situation when they return home (especially involving gender-based violence, religious persecution, and social discrimination).54 Further, repatriation policies also need to hold individuals accountable if their involvement in ISIS meets the standard for terrorism and/or war crimes in established courts of law.55 The repatriation process must be fair, equitable and ensure the safety of the ISIS affiliates and their children throughout the process and after.
The immediate and long-term humanitarian and security concern of the women and children detained at al-Hol requires that the international community act swiftly to prevent further trauma and radicalization.
